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RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND
JUDGEMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE. By
Lance Bennett and

w.

Martha S. Feldman. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
Press. 1981. Pp. x, 203. $14.50.
The criminal trial is a complex procedure, governed by a multitude of
seemingly irreconcilable technical rules. Judges and lawyers, in addition to
their legal education, often spend years mastering courtroom language and
procedures. Despite these complexities, the American criminal justice system thrusts uninitiated laymen into the jury box and requires them to make
judgments with grave consequences. The questions of how jurors adapt to
this new environment and render decisions of guilt and innocence have
been the subject of considerable study. 1 In Reconstructing Reality in the
Courtroom, social scientists W. Lance Bennett and Martha S. Feldman theorize that the key to understanding the criminal jury's decision-making process is an every-day communication device - the story.2
Understanding how the story enables the actors in a criminal trial to
communicate sensibly and to perform their roles properly can clear up
"several of the mysteries surrounding criminal trials" (pp. 4-5). For example, it is unclear how jurors assimilate vast amounts of technical information, when lawyer behavior significantly affects trial outcome, and how bias
subtly infiltrates the judicial.process (pp. 5-6). Bennett and Feldman argue
that "[d]espite that maze of legal jargon, lawyers' mysterious tactics, and
obscure court procedures, any criminal case can be reduced to the simple
form of a story" (p. 4). Unfortunately, there is no such simple device to help
lawyers decipher the "maze of social science jargon" in which the authors
mask the answers to these mysteries.
The book is divided into four parts. In Parts I and II, Bennett and Feldman explain why stories are appropriate tools to assist jurors in organizing
information and how they are used to do so. Familiar literary devices, such
as flashbacks, fl.ash-forwards, and subplots enable jurors to incorporate
complex, disjointed, and conflicting testimony into a coherent scenario.
Grammar conventions, such as verb tense and pronoun usage, further help
jurors to assimilate information and to identify the central action. Juries
also draw on their ''vast store of background knowledge about social life"
(p. 50) to make inferences where gaps or ambiguities exist. Jurors then integrate the central action, the surrounding actions, and their background
knowledge, to interpret the overall story. Finally, the jury evaluates the five
I. See, e.g., M. GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 217-67 (1968); H. KALVEN, JR. & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Il!lfuencing Jury Verdicts,
3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1973); Costopoulos, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10
DUQ. L. REV. 89 (1972); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REV. 601; Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-Legal Influences, Group Process, and Jury
.Decision-Making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 96 (1980).
2. The authors define a story as "simply a communicational form that provides for the
development, climax, and denouement of action in the context of a defined collection of actors,
motives, and scenes." P. 7.
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elements of the story (scene, act, agent, agency, and purpose) for completeness and consistency (p. 62).
Throughout the book, but particularly in Part II, Bennett and Feldman
rely on intricate and technical arguments to support their theory that "the
structure of a story can be just as important as its documentation" (p. 67).
Readers lacking a strong social science background may find the discussion
in Part II only marginally intelligible. Readers trained in law may prefer to
concentrate on Chapter 1, where the authors lay out their theory, and then
jump directly to Part III, where the authors apply their theory to the criminal trial.3
In Part III, Bennett and Feldman shift their focus from the jury to the
lawyers. Because juries process information through the use of stories, the
authors argue, lawyers must be sensitive to the structure of the story they
present to the jury. In his intructions to the jury, the judge identifies the
elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. The authors
equate these elements to the five structural elements of a story. Because the
government bears the burden of proof in a criminal trial, the need to fashion "a structurally complete and internally consistent story that [considers]
all the evidence" (p. 97), dictates the prosecution's trial strategy.
The defense, on the other hand, shapes its strategy according to the
structural strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's story. When the
prosecution fails to present a complete story, the defense employs the "challenge strategy." The defense points out the gaps or inconsistencies in the
prosecution's theory through cross-examination and closing statements.
When the prosecution's story is complete, but contains an ambiguous central element, the defense relies on the "redefinition strategy." If the defense can disrupt several connections in the prosecution's account of the
relevant facts by redefining a key element, the resulting inconsistencies can
render that account suspect. When the prosecution's story is structurally
sound and unambiguous, but fails to incorporate a large amount of evidence, the defense counters with the "reconstruction strategy." This strategy "involves placing the central action in the context of an entirely new
story to show that it merits a different interpretation" (p. 104).
The effect of each side's strategy upon the jury depends upon "the careful development and use of tactics" (p. 116). Each lawyer may make hundreds of tactical moves during the course ofa trial. Although many of these
moves may be captivating and dramatic, only those that affect the development of the chosen strategy are likely to influence the outcome. Bennett
and Feldman identify three influential trial tactics. Through "definitional
tactics," lawyers elicit precise answers from witnesses "to narrow the possible definitions of evidence to just the ones that fit" (p. 118) their story strategy. "Inferential tactics" enable lawyers to establish connections that fit
loose bits of evidence into the central action to create a consistently structured story. Through ''validation tactics," lawyers strengthen their evidence
3. The authors' "theory emerged gradually over the course of more than a year of ethnographic study of criminal trials in the Superior Court of the state of Washington in King
County (Seattle), Washington. P. 11. They observed over sixty criminal trials and studied the
transcripts of forty trials. Additionally, two videotapes of actual trials were made available to
them.

March 1983]

Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom

lOll

by pointing out consistent evidence elsewhere in the story and by establishing the credibility of the witness. Lawyers who master these tactics, the
authors argue, can improve the likelihood of a favorable verdict.
In Part IV, Bennett and Feldman use the story framework to bring coherence to the fragmented body of current literature addressing bias in the
courtroom. The authors acknowledge that variables such as racial
prejudice and the nature of the crime may influence jury decisionmaking.
However, "[s]uch factors become relevant in trial only when they intersect
with central judgmental issues in stories" (p. 149). While social prejudices
cannot be eliminated,
if we can identify the cognitive-communicational structure of legal judgement, then it should be possible to detect story strategies that make extraneous factors more or less likely to enter judgements. If such story
characteristics can be monitored, then it should be possible to make formal
rulings about the acceptability of cases to alert participants to the likelihood that particular factors will enter judgement in a particular case. [P.
149.]
Bias, then, involves more than some prejudice against a particular party.
To be significant, bias must also operate in the jury's understanding of the
facts.
The reliance on storytelling in the courtroom can bias jurors despite
their sincere efforts to make impartial decisions. Individuals who lack the
communication skills to produce a structurally sound story are less credible
witnesses, even though they are telling the truth. Further, when a structurally sound story is told, the jury may disbelieve the witness unless they
"share the norms, experiences, and assumptions necessary to draw connections among story elements" (p. 171). The jury's inability to relate to a
witness is the most threatening type of prejudice, since it is the most difficult
to detect.
While Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom may be of interest to social scientists, its value to the legal profession is limited. Its most apparent
limitation is the complex social science vernacular in which its analysis is
cast. A more significant limitation, however, is its failure to provide any
new advice on how to improve the criminal justice system. The most practical advice offered is that lawyers should realize that cultural differences
between witness and jurors can lead to breakdowns in communication.
This, however, is scarcely a new concern.4 The book does little more than
impose an obscure description on familiar phenomena, implying the necessary but erroneous message that those who master the authors' vocabulary
will thereby gain an understanding of the courtroom that only experience
can provide.

4. See Note, The Jury: A Reflection ofthe Prejudices ofthe Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1417, 1418 (1969) ("Cultural differences - ignorance of mores, language, life styles - compound the jury problem where defendants are not from the predominant socio-economic
group, particularly where racial differences are present."). The Note goes on to use the same
example used by Bennett and Feldman (p. 181)- the defendant who had been put "in the
dozens." Id. at 1419.

LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY -

JURY BEHAVIOR.

By L. Craig Parker. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas. 1980. Pp.
vii, 185. $22.75.
In Legal Psychology, L. Craig Parker presents an overview of the legal
and psychological concepts of eyewitness testimony and jury behavior. The
author attempts to integrate the discipline of psychology into legal practice
in order to overcome the reluctance of the legal profession to employ psychological concepts. After a brief outline of the other contexts in which
these disciplines interact, Parker examines a large volume of psychological
research pertaining to two discrete areas - eyewitness testimony and jury
behavior. As a complement to these studies, he reviews Supreme Court
decisions relevant to these subjects. Unfortunately, his discussion only infrequently goes beyond this sum'llary format. Parker fails to suggest any
guidelines for the practical application of psychology to the practice oflaw.
Legal Psychology is, consequently, unlikely to have a significant impact on
either psychological or legal literature.
Parker first attempts to provide some background on the interface of
law and psychology. He begins by briefly summarizing the legal-psychological overlap involved in areas ranging from eyewitness testimony to legal
socialization. This is followed by a historical survey of those psychological
studies with legal implications. This somewhat haphazard section leaves
the lay reader overwhelmed, not only by the large number of studies surveyed, but also by their tenuous relevance to the book's subject matter. Although this survey may be of interest to psychologists, it is too unwieldly to
be of use to lawyers. Parker does underscore the undeserved nature of the
legal field's ambivalence towards psychology, but, in general, this overview
of the interface fails to give the lay reader the intended background.
Parker then examines the field of eyewitness testimony in detail. His
thesis throughout is that the present legal rules ignore the research conclusions: judges and juries are insensitive to the inaccuracies that are part of
most eyewitness testimony (p. 30). Parker finds it incongruous that the judiciary continues to stress the weight of eyewitness testimony when both
experimentation and actual mistaken identifications demonstrate that this
testimony is frequently inaccurate.
Parker focuses on the variables that might result in differing eyewitness
testimony for identical situations. Unfortunately, these variables, which
range from race to religion, sex to socioeconomic background, are
presented through an unorganized series of experimental results. 1 Parker
underlines an experimental variable as affecting eyewitness testimony and
applies his talent for criticism to the experiment's methodology. This leaves
the reader confused as to the actual significance of these variables. A section on the importance of these variables and their applicability to the legal
I. One reviewer indicates that Parker's list of experiments was not comprehensive and
omitted studies that had contributed significantly to this particular field. See Wells, Gaps and
Canyons in Psycho-Lego/ Research (Book Review), 27 CONTEMP. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1982).
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issues surrounding eyewitness testimony2 would have been helpful. The
judiciary is unlikely to adopt psychological principles without guidelines
for accurately doing so.
This failure to provide direction is even more apparent in Parker's section on memory testing. The research in this area presents excellent possibilities for practical application in a legal context. Parker surveys studies
ranging from the effect of mug shot displays on memory retention (interference) to tests on the comparative accuracy of identification between artist's
sketches and composite portraits. An experiment on the number of incorrect identifications resulting from the nonverbal cues of the person conducting the trial identification seems, for example, an obvious candidate for
legal implementation. Parker again declines the opportunity to summarize
this psychological data in a way that would indicate a direction for legal
reform.
Parker does attempt, through Supreme Court decisions,3 to illustrate the
legal perspective on eyewitness testimony. He finds that the decisions fluctuate from excellent analyses applying recent psychological studies4 to decisions based solely on intuition.5 A case not discussed by Parker
underscores his frustration with legal rulings. In United States v. Crews 6
the Cou1t, without the benefit of psychological studies, held that a witness'
courtroom identification rested on an independent recollection and was not
the result of illegally obtained pretrial identification.7 The research in this
area, however, indicates that the initial identification becomes a reinforcement for all future identifications. The illegal pretrial identification would
then prejudice the defendant at trial (p. 110). This supports Parker's theme
that the courts often ignore or reject the findings of experimental
psychology.
Yet Parker again fails to provide proposals to remedy the deficiencies.
He points out that the Court has attempted to safeguard defendants by requiring the presence of a lawyer at the identification. The lawyer, however,
is unlikely to know how to protect his client in this situation. Parker
stresses the prejudice and bias which pervades many identifications, but he
fails to provide practical instruction for the lawyer who has a client in a
lineup. Parker merely discusses suggestions, such as videotaped lineups,
made by other commentators without recommending any (pp. 110-15).
Parker thus adds very little to the understanding or prevention of inaccurate eyewitness identifications. Legal commentators have long recognized the unreliability of this sort oftestimony.8 The key legal problem2. Parker has been criticized for failing to discriminate between variables that can be used
in a practical context and those that have only questionable value for those in the legal field.
Id at 56.
3. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1973); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
4. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967).
5. See Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977).
6. 44S U.S. 463 (1980).
7. 445 U.S. at 473.
8. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); E. LOFrUS, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY (1979); P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965); Le-
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devising procedures to reduce the risks of erroneous identifications without
crippling criminal law enforcement - has already been resourcefully undertaken by other observers.9 The need, therefore, is less for another demonstration that eyewitness testimony is suspect than for the political
determination to do something about it. Parker's book is highly unlikely to
contribute to this last objective.
Parker next examines the research and legal practice on jury decision
rules. After a succinct review of the Supreme Court cases on jury size and
unanimous decisions, 10 Parker again enters the realm of psychological literature.11 He emphasizes that when the courts have used psychological studies in their rationale, they have often relied on research of limited
credibility. Parker does an excellent job of pointing out the weaknesses in
the experiments on jury decision rules. Weaknesses include the homogeneity of the subject sample (frequently college students) as opposed to the
heterogeneous sample required for jury selection, and the inherent differences between deciding a hypothetical case and an actual case. Again, the
thorough criticism of these psychological hypotheses leaves the reader insecure as to their importance. The overall thrust of the results is that the
decisions of a six-person jury and a nonunanimous twelve-person jury may
infringe upon a defendant's rights. Parker stresses, however, that because
of "outstanding weaknesses" these studies are of questionable value to the
judiciary (p. 141). This subject, however, does illustrate the promise of experimental research on legal issues. Parker emphasizes the limitations of
this research without minimizing psychology's potential. The reader is left
with the hope that future research may resolve the lingering uncertainty.
Parker also analyzes some of the research on jury behavior. He divides
his analysis into two sections. First he reviews the studies on nonlegal factors, such as sex, race and status, that can influence jury decisions. Unfortunately, the data generated by these studies seems too piecemeal to
advance knowledge much beyond the intuitive level. Parker's next section,
on the use of social scientists in jury selection, reinforces this skepticism. He
comments on the legal arguments espousing the dangers of stacking the
jury. Parker, however, hesitates to give any credence to the alleged benefits
of experimental psychology to jury selection procedures. Lawyers should
note that in order for psychological techniques to have any significant effect, the psychologist must have an unusually comprehensive background
in this area and the evidence must be sufficiently ambiguous for jury biases
to influence the ultimate decision. Until further developments occur in this
vine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gapftom Wade to Kirby, 121 U.
PA. L. REV. 1079 (1973).
9. See, e.g., Sobel,Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion: Evolving Limitations on the Abuse
of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261 (1971) (suggesting,
among other things, "blank lineups" - lineups in which the suspect does not initially
participate).
10. Recent cases that Parker does not include in his discussion are Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979) (The Court held that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution that permitted nonunanimous six-person jury decisions were unconstitutional.), and Brown v. Louisiana,
447 US. 323 (1980) (The Court held that the decision in Burch was retroactive.).
II. Wells suggests that psychologists may find M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS (1977), a more
thorough work on jury behavior. Wells, supra note I, at 56.
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field, Parker suggests that the intuition of the individual lawyer may be just
as productive a tool for jury selection as experimental psychology.
An additional chapter tying these loose ends of psychological research
together would be useful to both lawyers and psychologists. While Parker
bemoans the reluctance of lawyers to use psychology, the reader is left unsure of what Parker feels should be psychology's contribution to the law.
He outlines flaws in the research, but does not deal directly with the concerns of lawyers. A legitimate concern is that psychological studies are
oversimplified and, therefore, are not applicable to real life situations (p.
17). As a summary of recent Supreme Court law and psychological studies,
Parker's presentation is often unorganized. The reader is required to decide
for himself which principles are relevant to the legal problems. The discipline of legal psychology has a vast opportunity for selecting those experimental results that are valid and designing methods of applying them to
legal procedure. A better understanding of legal issues, however, is important to any book hoping to influence psychology's effect on the law. Legal
Psychology fails to address the concerns of lawyers, and hence fails in its
intended goals. 12

12. Parker's book is also reviewed by Wells, supra note 1.

